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Abstract 
Internationalisation of capital grew rapidly in the post-war period, driven initially by US-based TNCs. International 
capitals were able to trade off production conditions in different economies against national regimes of regulation. 
Consequently, these regimes were increasingly subject to amendment in order to attract mobile investment. Such changes 
were panicularly significant for local and national labour movements. Growing mobility of capital undermined the 
organisational and locational specificity of labour. Labour's response was to seek to internationalise collective bargaining 
in an attempt to impose an measure of international regulation on international capital. This response, first theorised in the 
1960s, has generally failed. However, with the growth of international regulation of capital in recent years - for example, 
the WTO, proposed measures to control international investment, international production standards, the creation of 
powerful economic blocs prepared to place labour standards on the agenda ( NAFTA, EU, APEC)- the possibility has arisen 
for labour to take advantage of international regulatory developments to press for the international imposition of core 
Labour standards. Initiatives taken by the ICFTU-APRO in the Asian/South Pacific region illustrate this development. 
However, given the nature of contemporary international regulation, labour strategies in this area are not guaranteed success. 
Is the international labour movement and, in particular, the 
international trade union movement able to mount an effec-
tive strategy against internationalised capital ? This question 
in one form or another has been debated since the nineteenth 
century but took on a particular significance in the post 
Second World War period, when internationalisation of 
manufacturing, then service, capital grew apace. Since the 
early 1970s, when Levinson initiated the modem debate 
about international collective bargaining (Levinson 1972), 
theoretical work about the prospects for labour internation-
alism has grown in parallel with practical attempts to create 
successful organisational models for the international trade 
union movement. Broadly, these practical initiatives have 
enjoyed at best limited success. However, in recent years, 
the creation of the European Union (EU), the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) and, in the Asia Pacific 
region, Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), has in 
conjunction with the growth of concern about international 
labour standards, suggested to the trade union movement 
some space for international manoeuvre. This paper focuses 
on the creation of this space, particularly in the context of 
APEC. 
Once more unto the debate, dear friends ... 
Post-war internationalisation of capital is now accepted as a 
given in economic analysis. The size of MNCs, their geo-
graphical scope, the development of internationalised serv-
ices , particularly in the financial sector, the perception of 
nation-state weakness in the face of internationalisation are 
well documented in a vast and growing literature. Support-
192 
ing this literature is a second, analysing the replacement of 
Keynesian by nee-liberal policies from the 1970s onwards. 
This literature, coupled to a parallel management literature, 
focuses on the inevitability and desirability of internationali-
sation. The concept of globalisation has become a common-
place, although attempts to give it a degree of analytical 
precision have yet to succeed. Further supporting this out-
look on the world is the erosion of Industrial Relations by the 
tides of Human Resource Management. Traditional focus on 
national bargaining systems is giving way to a homogenised 
and universal conceptualisation of job enrichment and en-
largement in a non-unionised, unitary framework. 
Trade unions have generally fared poorly in this new envi-
ronment. Restructuring has eroded recruitment bases, man-
agement strategies have sought to replace collective bar-
gaining with enterprise-based arrangements, public sector 
union strongholds have been assailed, changing employee 
demographics have contributed to union difficulties, the 
unions themselves have often been laggard in their develop-
ment of responses, the development of international strate-
gies has been a secondary concern to unions under assault, 
particularly when issues such as social dumping have arisen. 
In the 1960s, however, things appeared somewhat differ-
ently. In his classic text - International Trade Unionism -
Charles Levinson posed the question of an international 
trade union strategy to counteract the growing impact of 
MNCs. The heart of the strategy was the development of 
international collective bargaining. By extending bargain-
ing with MNC subsidiaries in one country to integrated 
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negotiations around common themes involving multiple 
unions and many or all of an MNC' s subsidiaries, the trade 
union movement' s response to the internationalisation of 
capital would be logically achieved. Moreover, interna-
tional collective bargaining would lead to a gradual equali-
sation of wages and conditions across the globe, eroding the 
ability ofMNCs to move capital to low wage or unorganised 
economies and providing the international labour move-
ment with further opportunities for growth. 
Levinson argued that experience supported his arguments 
(Press 1984 ). Evidence was growing of international organi-
sation of unions against MNCs and this provided a base for 
the development of full blown international collective bar-
gaining. The extent to which this was true has been the 
subject of extensive debate (see Press for an overview). 
However, it is worth remembering the context in which 
Levinson was writing. His experience was based on union 
activities in the 1960s in a period when the Keynesian post-
war accommodation was still firmly in place. National 
legislative regimes were still often supportive of trade un-
ions rights and unions enjoyed some status in macroeconomic 
planning (by dint of association with the parties of labour 
and/or because of bargaining power). It was also a period 
when analyses of the MNCs were predicting ever-increasing 
concentration of MNC power and where limitations to the 
operation of international capital now recognised were less 
well understood. This potent combination of union status 
and power and the challenge of MNCs provided fertile 
ground for the assumption that objective conditions for 
international collective bargaining existed, an assumption 
rejected by, amongst others, Olle and Schoeller ( 1977). It 
also seemed obvious that a range of institutional responses 
to the internationalisation of capital existed, too. Interna-
tional trade union federations- the ICFfU, WFTU and WCL 
in particular - vied for international dominance. Regional 
federations such as the ETUC were emerging with strong 
regional agendas. The ITSs and other sectoral or industrial 
bodies were active, often on the basis of a century's experi-
ence. And, perhaps above all, rank-and-file organisation 
began to emerge in multi-plant companies- the Ford, Lucas 
and Massey Ferguson Combine Committees were examples 
of this in the UK, but similar bodies emerged in the US, the 
Netherlands, Germany and so on. Sometimes aided by 
organisations such as the Transnational Information 
Exchange(TIE), these rank-and-file committees sought to 
implement international collective bargaining on the basis 
of bottom-up actions, sometimes to the transparent discom-
fort of trade union officialdom. 
Levinson' s sanguine approach to the possibilities for inter-
national collective bargaining was challenged not only by 
empirical observation. In 1977, Olle and Schoeller launched 
a frontal attack on the basic premises upon which Levinson ' s 
argument was based. In a seminal piece, they put forward 
three key points. First, the idea that new objective conditions 
for trade union internationalism have emerged misunder-
stands and misrepresents a long tradition of such activity 
since the nineteenth century. The lessons of history are 
important to the endeavour to create international collective 
bargaining and should not be sidelined by the assertion of 
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new "objective" conditions in the post-war period. Second, 
Levinson' s argument is economic reductionism, defining 
the relationships between international capital and labour 
solely in terms of the outcomes of collective bargaining. 
Consequently, trade union internationalism is presented as a 
simple analogue of the internationalisation of capital. Moreo-
ver, in the most telling argument: 
There are (in Levinson) two central theses here: first , that 
an equalisation in the different national levels of repro-
duction of the workers minimises (competition between 
workers); and, secondly, that favourable conditions for 
such an equalisation ... are created by the multinational 
corporation (Olle and Schoeller, 1977. p 57). 
Thirdly, Levinson 's view of international trade unionism is 
syndicalist, that is, it eschews the need to combine economic 
with political internationalism. 
Olle and Schoeller's key contribution lies in their second 
thesis. They reject the central theme ofLevinson 's analysis; 
that is, there is, they aver, no necessary reason why interna-
tional solidarity between workers should emerge logically 
or necessarily from the responses to the internationalisation 
of capital. Taken together, their theses suggest that labour 
internationalism defined by narrow economism will founder 
on competition between different "fractions" of workers 
enjoying quite different conditions of production. 
Haworth and Ramsay (1984) build on the challenge to 
Levinson begun by Olle and Schoeller by attempting to 
understand theoretically why there is no necessary reason 
for an effective international labour response to internation-
alised capital to emerge. They establish their argument 
initially in terms of observation of a variety of attempts to 
create effective challenges to MNC decision-making by 
unions. They move on to posit two types of argument why 
their might be a fundamental asymmetry between the logic 
of labour organisation and the logic of capital internationali-
sation. The frrst argument is couched in terms of value 
theory, the second in sociological theory. In value terms, 
argue Haworth and Ramsay, the international capitalist: 
... will be concerned about both concrete and abstract 
aspects of production but can d ispense with any par-
ticular set of workers as concrete/use values in favour of 
another particular set, providing that abstract labour as 
value-creating and homogeneous is open to appropria-
tion. (Haworth and Ramsay 1984 p69). 
In value theory terms, worker consciousness and hence, 
capacity to organise, is defined by experience as a use-value 
or commodity and the opposition thrown up individually and 
collectively against such a definition. Management, on the 
other hand, recognises the specificity of the commodity 
form of labour - hence the need for management - yet also 
perceives labour in its abstract, homogeneous, value-creat-
ing form. Thus, the generalisation of production across 
plants and national boundaries offers to management the 
opportunity to minimise the specific( concrete) and maxim-
ise the abstract form of labour, reducing the impact on 
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production of any particular group or collective of workers. 
Thus, in value theory terms, internationalisation permits the 
increased expropriation of sw-plus value and a parallel 
enervation of worker opposition in the labour process. 
This argument may be couched in more sociological terms, 
argue Haworth and Ramsay. Worker organisation relies for 
its effectiveness on many characteristics, including a sense 
of identity , shared experience, common interests, often 
experienced within spatially-narrow confines such as 
workplaces and communities. These characteristics are dis-
sipated as organisation moves away from these confines . 
The further away one moves from these traditional bases of 
experience and organisation, the more difficult it becomes to 
sustain the rationale for workers' organisations. Hence, it is 
hardly surprising that, in the epoch of the nation-state, 
effective worker organisations have found it difficult to 
operate beyond national boundaries. Similarly, the increas-
ing internal 'distance' between grass roots membership of 
worker organisations and regional, national and interna-
tional union leaderships should not sw-prise the observer. 
Haworth and Ramsay extend this combined analysis to 
include interpretations of other factors which undermine 
effective organisation at a global level, including gender-
based divisions of labour and the impact of nee-colonialism. 
Their conclusions not only bear out the arguments advanced 
by Olle and Schoeller but also provide a theoretical basis for 
the rejection of Levinson' s thesis of international equalisa-
tion through international collective bargaining. 
The line of argument from Olle and Schoeller through 
Haworth and Ramsay was justifiably interpreted as ex-
tremely pessimistic. Both contributions posed the question 
of a wider political internationalisation as the only way to 
overcome the weaknesses of a narrow labourist strategy. 
Understandably, trade union commentators were less than 
happy with this challenge to their role. In particular, union-
ists pointed to the flurry of activity around MNCs and FDI 
which emerged in the early 1970s as, perhaps a decade or 
more too late, national and international union movements 
came to grips with an internationalisation which took off in 
the late 1940s. Far too often this activity was prompted by a 
need to respond to international capital' s actions. Plant 
closures, relocation of investment, conditions on further 
investment highlighted the substitutability of any particular 
workforce. The implications of capital mobility became 
clear as new investment opportunities grew beyond the 
traditional industrialised economies. 
Yet, as this realisation dawned in the western industrialised 
nations, further challenges to the Levinson strategy, unim-
aginable in the late 1960s/early 1970s, were emerging. 
Liberalisation, restructuring and the assault 
on labour 
The general impact of liberalisation and restructuring across 
the industrialised economies need not be discussed in detail. 
Suffice it to note that, consequent on the oil shocks of the 
1970s, a crisis of profitability with roots in the post-war 
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settlement engendered a milieu in which the Keynesian 
accommodation was displaced by nee-liberal commitment 
to deregulation, market freedom, support for increased inter-
national trade, a reduced role for government and a profound 
erosion of the welfare state. Central to deregulation in 
numerous economies has been the reform of bargaining 
systems, broadly conducted to achieve labour flexibility, 
recuperate managerial authority, increase productivity per-
formance and increase international competitiveness. Trends 
within this agenda have included the balance shifting from 
national or sectoral bargaining (where they existed) to the 
enterprise, and, frequently, legislative intervention to limit 
collectivist distortion of the price of labour (that is, a reduc-
tion in the rights and privileges of trade unions). 
Management strategy has also advanced on a number of 
fronts during this period. Two particular instances are rel-
evant here. First, concepts of flatter organisational structures 
and more 'organic' systems of management were coupled 
with models of the firm's competitive advantage to provide 
more sophisticated ways of capitalising on international 
production opportunities . Management thinking, driven by 
necessity, innovated, even though the take-up of such inno-
vation was not necessarily generalised. Second, the practice 
of collective bargaining - and its theoretical underpinnings 
in pluralist industrial relations analysis- was challenged by 
the internationalisation of Human Resource Management as 
both ideology and practice. Ideologically, HRM provided a 
unitarist rationale for the conduct of enterprise 'employee 
relations ' whilst promoting an array of employment prac-
tices which restructured employment relations round man-
agement agendas. The development of management think-
ing paralleled the international challenges faced by manage-
ment. For reasons noted above, trade unions were less well 
placed to develop innovative responses to internationalisa-
tion. 
As a consequence of these changes, trade unions in the 
industrialised world approached the contemporary interna-
tionalised economic environment on the basis of declining 
union densities, myriad pressing domestic challenges, chang-
ing workforce demographics, innovating management and 
unresponsive governments. By the late 1980s, a picture 
emerged on a trade union movement substantially ill-pre-
pared to respond to the internationalisation of capital and 
certainly unable to create a Levinson-like strategic response. 
Another major international transformation- the collapse of 
the Soviet system - brought with it mixed blessings for the 
international trade union movement. Independent union 
movements arose in contexts where economic policy was 
generally driven by a nee-liberal agenda. Importantly, the 
Prague-based World Federation of Trade Unions (WFfU), 
at one time the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions' (ICFTU) only truly international competition, col-
lapsed. Opinion broadly supports the view that this has 
allowed the ICFTU to act internationally more effectively, a 
point to which we return below. 
A final contextual comment on relevant developments since 
the early 1970s relates to the emergence of new centres of 
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trade union organisation in newly-industrialising econo-
mies. When Levinson developed his thesis in the 1960s, 
trade unionism beyond the developed industrialised econo-
mies and the Soviet-Chinese bloc generally confronted the 
challenge of industrialisation. In Latin America, import 
substitution regimes since the 1930s continued the model of 
resource relocation from rural peasant production to agro-
export and industrial production. Highly-politicised union 
movements emerged. Similarly. in Africa, the post-colonial 
period saw radical nationalis t regimes attempt a similar 
industrialisation process with similar consequences in terms 
of unionisation. In the 1960s, Japanese modernisation was 
attracting attention, but Korean and Singaporean industriali-
sation was in its early stages and, more generally, the 
economic performance of the East Asian NICs was 
unheralded. In all three areas - Africa, Latin America and 
Asia- the trade union movement was subjected to affiliation 
pressure from both the ICFfU and the WFfU. In all three 
cases, traditional internationalisation had been in terms of 
raw material extraction and agro-exports rather than trade in 
manufactures. 
By the 1990s, much has changed in the so-called Third 
World. In much of Africa south of the Sahara, development 
strategies have failed and the possibility of trade union 
growth has consequently been reduced. Even in cases, for 
example, such as Kenya, heralded as a successful integration 
into the international economy, growth has been at best 
modest. Modest growth has reduced the interest of interna-
tional capital in much of Africa south of the Sahara. Latin 
America has seen a period of decline in the 1970s and 1980s, 
followed by an economic recovery in the 1990s, often as a 
result of draconian neo-liberal policies. Trade unions have 
suffered in both periods. Asia, of course, has seen a tremen-
dous rate of economic expansion based on state-led industri-
alisation. Whilst the growth model has been predicated in 
part on modest wage levels, a combination of democratisa-
tion and labour organisation has thrown up independent 
union movements of some moment, particularly in Korea 
and Taiwan. Elsewhere, pressures for such a development 
burgeon. All East Asian economies have sought to increase 
their success in international markets; some have done so on 
a basis of collaboration with overseas capital (eg Singapore), 
others with less involvement with overseas capital(eg Tai-
wan). Thus, from a trade union perspective, Latin America 
and Asia are two regions which attract particular attention in 
terms of international solidarity issues. 
Regulation, liberalisation and re-regulation 
Mention was made previously of the impacts of neo-liberal 
deregulation on trade union activities since the late 1970s. 
An important feature of this deregulation has been the 
relationship between the nation-state, regulation and the 
neo-liberal agenda and the consequences of this relationship 
for internationalisation and the trade union movement. Neo-
liberalism has promoted the view that the nation-state should 
refrain from intervention in economic policy (except where 
such intervention promotes competitive activity). Such ab-
stention promotes the efficient management of resources in 
a market envirorunent and long-term will be to the econo-
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my 's economic advantage. Thus, an equation is promoted as 
follows: minimal government intervention plus deregula-
tion equals international competitiveness plus improved 
well-being. In the equation, internationalisation is a given 
which provides the context for welfare maximisation. By 
extension, if trade unions act as a major price distorting 
agency in domestic economies, they cumulatively act in 
similar manner in the internationalised economy. By further 
extension, a Levinson-like international equalisation on the 
basis of collective bargaining would be anathema, a view 
implicit in may of the neo-liberal commentaries on the 
contemporary labour standards debate. 
However, the relationship between domestic deregulation, 
international competitiveness and internationalisation is 
complex. Domestic regulation has three possible elements 
within it- the imposition of the neo-liberal' s 'rule of law', a 
protective element (as in health and safety and factory 
legislation) and an element required for the effective repro-
duction of capital. Often, any given regulatory process will 
contain all three elements . Each element comes about for 
different reasons. 
Regulation as the imposition of the rule of law is a sine qua 
non for the protection of property rights and the functioning 
of the market. It emerges in parallel with the emergence of 
extended market relations and is the subject of constitutional 
and judicial amendment. 
Regulation as protection derives from a mixture of proc-
esses, primarily emerging from social and political aware-
ness of the perils of excess . Thus, for example, envirorunen-
tal protection derives from a moral and technical under-
standing of the breadth of adverse outcomes for all species 
which will follow envirorunental degradation. Protection of 
labour emerges in part from political philosophies which set 
store by the dignity of people and argue that minimum 
standards are a moral imperative. 
From the point of view of capitalist accumulation, regulation 
also emerges as a precondition for the 'conditions of exist-
ence' of accumulation. Taking both functionalist and non-
functionalist forms, this view of regulation argues that 
Capital requires domestic regulation of capitals in order that 
short-sighted, predatory actions by some capitals do not 
permanently damage the long-term interests of the capitalist 
system. Thus, for example, labour standards may be under-
stood not simply as the effect of moral suasion. They are 
also, even primarily, a response to early industrial practices 
which threatened the continuing reproduction of adequate 
supplies of labour of the appropriate age and skill. 
What happens when internationalisation takes off as it has 
since the Second World War? It is too simple to argue that 
internationalisation, coupled with post -1970s deregulation, 
undermines an effective regulatory framework. Rather, the 
issues become: what is the relationship between transformed 
domestic regulation and the international economy and to 
what extent does internationalisation call forth an equivalent 
reregulation at the international level? 
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To answer the first question briefly, it is clear that, whilst 
deregulation has gone on apace in many economies, interna-
tionalisation has not made the nation-state redundant. Do-
mestic regulation continues in a transformed role, varying in 
content from economy to economy. In the senses of regula-
tion as the rule of law and as the safeguard of capitalist 
accumulation, domestic regulation is still in place and, given 
the increasingly complex relationship between nation-state 
and internationalisation, is set to continue. In the case of 
regulation as protection, political and moral justifications 
have lost ground in the nation-state with the advent of neo-
liberal individualism. 
An international reregulation in response to internationali-
sation provides interesting ground for analysis. Of course, 
international regulation has been around for centuries -
politically in terms of bilateral and multilateral treaties and 
agencies such as the League of Nations and the United 
Nations; economically in terms, or example, of Navigation 
Acts, pricing cartels, GATT and the Word Trade Organisa-
tion ; morally in terms, for example, of the Geneva Conven-
tions and ILO conventions. However, in recent years, a more 
integrated international regulation has begun to emerge in 
response to economic internationalisation. Three examples 
illustrate this movement - environmental regulation, trade 
regulation under the WTO and regulation of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
Environmental regulation moves at two levels- the global, 
as in, for example, the Law of the Sea, and the more specific 
as in the case of the recently promulgated ISO 14000. In the 
case of the latter, regulation as protection combines with 
regulation as necessary for Capital in the creation of environ-
mental standards for production and distribution. What 
distinguishes ISO 14000 from other ISO categories is that it 
brings into the quality arena issues outside the immediate 
confines of production and distribution and requires produc-
tion to respond appropriately to these issues. The expected 
widespread implementation of this standard provides a basis 
for substantial regulation of production-environment rela-
tionships internationally. 
Trade regulation under the auspices of the WTO has moved 
beyond trade in commodities to include services and intel -
lectual property issues. Thus, the Uruguay Round has ex-
tended the GATT' s regulatory role. Furthermore, the signa-
tories to the Marrakech agreement have accepted a powerful 
disciplinary regime designed to ensure adherence to WTO 
regulations ( though the implications of such a regime for 
domestic USA politics have still to be worked through !). 
Third, UNCTAD, in its 1996 World Investment Report, 
notes the expansion of internationalisation, its consequences 
for trade, the integrated international production systems 
which are now emerging and opportunities open to national 
economies rising from increased flows of FDI. The report 
concludes that international arrangements governing FDI 
need to "catch up with the market" and focuses on a range of 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements emerging to govern 
international investment flows. In the bilateral area, bilateral 
investment treaties totalled 1160 in June 1996, two-thirds of 
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which were concluded in the 1990-96 period. In the multilat-
eral area, GA TS, TRIPS and TRIMS are simply examples of 
measures which impinge on the actions of FDI. The report 
points to a convergence of rules adopted by individual 
countries and, implicitly, poses the prospect of an imminent 
multilateral framework for FDI. This issues is also at the 
centre of various EU and APEC discussions about interna-
tional economic integration and has provoked the OECD 
into the preparation of a Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment. 
These examples illustrate a growing international regulatory 
response to internationalisation, belated but now growing in 
scope. Two aspects of this development should be consid-
ered in particular. The first is the continuing significance of 
the nation-state in this process. Bilateral and multilateral 
processes form the bas is of much of the 'nee-regulation' 
now emerging. In other words, nation-states are using inter-
national agreements to create regulatory environments 
unsustainable on the basis of the single nation. Regional 
blocs facilitate this process as we will se shortly. 
Second, it is, of course, argued (as in the case of the WTO and 
the UNCT AD Report) that contemporary international regu-
lation is about liberalising international economic relations 
in order to take advantage of the growth of world trade. 
Indeed, many critics of the these international relationships 
base their critique on a functionalist argument about the 
WTO, APEC etc being simply agencies for the promotion of 
further liberalisation, much as the World Bank was por-
trayed in the 1970s and 1980s. However, if such nee-
regulation consists of the elements noted above- the rule of 
law, protection and the underpinning of accumulation - the 
potential exists for o utcomes to be more than simply func-
tionally advantageous for Capital. The possibility exists for 
these conditions to become the site of political mobilisation 
and pressure. Indeed, such regulation carries with it a host of 
unanticipated consequences in terms of possible adjunct 
outcomes. So it is in the case of labour standards. In saying 
this, it must also be recognised that the perennial debate 
about the prospects for appropriating functional aspects of 
capitalist accumulation for alternative ends wages around 
this view of nee-regulation. As we indicate below in relation 
to the ICFfU, from an international union perspective, there 
may be little choice but to seek advantage in this way. 
On regional blocs 
Before moving to a discussion of the labour standards issue, 
a comment is required on the impact of regional blocs on the 
contemporary reregulation of the international economy. 
Regional blocs - based on multilateral commitments - are 
fertile grounds for the development ofTransnational regula-
tion. Furthermore, whilst their raison d 'etre may well be 
economic, the tendency exists for non-economic issues to 
impinge over time. Thus, for example, the Social Chapter of 
the EU Maastricht Treaty takes on board a range of factors 
beyond the economic. Similarly, the APEC agenda, whilst 
fixated on trade liberalisation, includes an economic devel-
opment commitment which in turn opens up APEC debates 
to issues beyond the confines of trade. Political will to 
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constrain debate to the economic is also sorely stretched. 
Where trade policy is clearly one of a range of diplomatic 
weapons available to a nation, the tendency for linkage to 
appear is well established. Thus labour rights amendments 
have been added to statutes governing General System of 
Preferences (GSP) programmes operated by the US, and 
more latterly the EU, requiring some developing countries to 
observe certain labour rights in return for preferential trade 
treatment. 
The NAFf A provides another case in point. It came into 
force in January 1994 after the Clinton administration had 
faced down a Republican-dominated House of Representa-
tives. The Administration wished to fulfil a 1992 campaign 
promise for the inclusion of two side agreements to the 
NAFf A; one dealing with labour, the other with the environ-
ment. What transpired, at least in the case of the labour 
agreement, pleased no-one, least of all the US trade union 
movement which continued to mobilise against theN AFT A. 
The main concern of US labour, shared by their Canadian 
counterparts, was that the shifting tide of jobs and invest-
ment southward to Mexico would accelerate, leading to 
increasing job loss and a downward pressure on wages. 
The argument for NAFf A underlines the now familiar case 
for free trade by supporting the proposal to eliminate all 
barriers to trade and investment by the year 2008. Critics 
argue that mainstream studies of NAFT A assume away the 
negative consequences of accelerating capital mobility which 
include job loss, the erosion of worker bargaining power and 
the generation of conflicting interests among organised 
workers in the different countries. For example, Canadian 
trade unions were more concerned than their US counter-
parts about the loss of national sovereignty which they 
argued would occur as a result ofNAFT A (Adams and Singh 
1996) . While paradoxically , the Confederaci6n de 
Trabajadores de Mexcio (Confederation of Mexican Work-
ers or CTM), essentially the labour arm of the historically 
dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI in 
Mexico, did not actively oppose theN AFT A but did oppose 
the labour side agreement. On the face of it at least the 
signing of the free trade agreement, which promised an 
estimated 600,000 new jobs, presented Mexican labour with 
few of the challenges confronting their counterparts in 
Canada and the US. 
These and other concerns prompted the side agreement on 
labour, or the more accurate, North American Agreement on 
Labour Co-operation (NAALC). The agreement promotes 
'guiding principles' subject to the domestic laws of the 
NAFT A signatories. These include freedom of association, 
the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike and the 
prohibition of forced labour. Altogether the agreement com-
mits the signatories to the promotion of eleven basic princi-
ples. To administer the implementation of the NAALC a 
Commission for Labour Co-operation was set up, which 
included a Ministerial Council, comprising the Labour Sec-
retary of each country, and an International Co-ordinating 
Secretariat, which acts as the administrative arm of the 
Commission. Unique to the NAALC, with no equivalent 
either in the environmental agreement or the EU Social 
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Chapter, is the National Administrative Office (NAO). The 
NAO establishes a unique mechanism whereby labour is-
sues are addressed outside national jurisdictions by requir-
ing each NAFfA country to constitute it's own NAO to 
respond to complaints concerning labour practices arising in 
another NAFTA country. 
Labour criticism of the NAALC has focused on three areas. 
First, the absence of common labour standards or any plan 
for gradual harmonisation among N AFT A parties of certain 
labour standards has attracted adverse comment. The agree-
ment simply requires each signatory to enforce its own 
labour laws subject to its own national regime. Second, 
concerns are expressed about the different treatment given to 
the eleven basic principles wherein three fundamental rights 
- the right of association, the right to organise and bargain, 
and the right to strike - are subject only to review and 
consultation. The eight remaining principles- forced labour, 
child labour, minimum wage and hour standards, employ-
ment discrimination, equal pay for men and women, health 
and safety, workers' compensation for occupational injuries 
and illnesses and protection of migrant workers - are subject 
to evaluation and recommendations by an Evaluation Com-
mittee of Experts (ECE). Of these, only three -child labour, 
health and safety, and minimum wage and hour standards-
can go forward to dispute resolution and possible sanctions 
(Herzstein, 1995). Thirdly, the processing of complaints 
through the NAALC can be complicated and time consum-
ing. Once a complaint has been submitted it can take up to 
two years before sanctions can be imposed upon a country 
found to be in persistent violation of existing national labour 
standards, and only then if equivalent labour standards exist 
in the objecting country and if the complaint concerns the 
production of goods and services between NAFT A signato-
nes. 
A number of factors militate against trade union solidarity 
within the NAFf A. The first relates to the suspicion and 
distrust that has historically coloured relations between US 
and Mexican labour (see, for example, Spalding 1977). Low 
wages, the non-enforcement of labour standards, a passive 
and largely unorganised labour force and geographic prox-
imity have been immensely attractive to US-based capital. 
Conversely the use of cheap immigrant labour in sectors of 
the US economy such as argriculture and textiles have led to 
tensions sometimes violent conflict. As a result concerns 
about job relocation to Mexico's maquila industries have 
been defined historically by mutual suspicion and distrust 
prompting periodic anti-Mexican drives among US labour 
rather than the development of an internationalisation strat-
egy based upon solidarity with their Mexican counterparts. 
The second relates to the post-war international strategy of 
the AFL/CIO. Traditionally based upon the principle that 
labour rights follow from a stable capitalist system, relations 
between the AFUCIO and the CTM have done little to 
improve the standard of labour regulation governing Mexi-
can workers, particularly within the maquila assembly plants. 
Concerns about the need for stable Government have over-
ridden more grassroots issues concerning labour standards 
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and their enforcement. CTM reluctance to stray from PRl 
policies and frequent repression of independent labour ac-
tivists deemed to be challenging those policies have not 
persuaded the AFUCIO to seek accommodations with other 
unions or support more independent voices within the Mexi-
can labour movement. Instead, international strategies have 
been based upon political stability rather than the pursuit of 
labour rights. 
The third relates to the lack of a regional co-ordinating body 
along the lines of the ETUC in the European Community ( ( 
if the cold war political agendas of ORIT (Organisacion 
Regional Inreramericana del Trabajo) are discounted)). The 
increasing influence of the ETUC in political as well as 
union circles has helped the co-ordination of labour re-
sponses to economic integration in the EU. ICFTU activities 
in the NAFf A region have traditionally focused upon Latin 
America and an extension of an AFUCIO internationalism 
based upon the pursuit of labour rights through political 
stability. Attempts at co-ordinated responses to the NAFf A 
agenda have tended to be been undermined by the tensions 
and influences outlined above, resulting in the proliferation 
of independent and nationally oriented labour strategies. 
The N AFf A example serves to underline the argument 
posed by Olle and Schoeller (Op cit) and Haworth and 
Ramsay (Op cit) - the internationalisation of labour is not 
necessarily the logical response to the internationalisation of 
capital. NAFf A and the discordant responses of organised 
labour to its neo-liberal agenda provides a telling example of 
the complex political economy of labour internationalism. 
Trade union strategies in an internationalised 
world 
Trade unions faced a bleak environment in the 1990s, as 
outlined above. However, notwithstanding these adverse 
conditions, the emergence of the ICFfU as the single nota-
ble international voice for the trade union movement has 
been coupled with a growing sophistication in analysis and 
strategic understanding of internationalisation. In turn, this 
sophistication provides the basis for trade union intervention 
into the nee-regulation process. 
The essential premise upon which ICFfU international 
strategy is founded is the yawning gap between the analysis 
informing the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Devel-
opment and the core economic policies of the key players in 
the world economy. Copenhagen argued for policies which 
attacked growing international poverty, created jobs and 
sought to reduce the growing differentials between advan-
taged and disadvantaged regions. It argued that the only way 
forward to achieve these ends was an integrated policy 
combining national and regional economic strategies. In 
contrast, argue the ICFTU, the key players in the world 
economy - the industrialised nations, the IMF, the World 
Bank and the OECD- continue to support market liberalisa-
tion and its associated policy prescriptions. This package 
reproduces the conditions that Copenhagen sought to over-
turn and, simultaneously, reduces the political will for change 
by limiting the role of government to economic caretaker. 
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The ICFTU goes on to argue that the large corporates which 
now dominate FDI are f1rn1ly wedded through self-interest 
to the liberalisation strategy and provide powerful support to 
pro-liberalisation governments. 
The ICFTU response to this monolithic view is twofold -
strengthen the voice of the international union movement by 
a range of organisational developments ( organising the 
informal sector , women and youth, building union strengths 
in developing and newly-industrialised economies, making 
the trade union voice heard on the international stage more 
loudly) and, second, strengthen the application of interna-
tional labour standards. It is to the latter that we turn. 
The ICFTU and international labour stand-
ards 
The ICFTU has been a powerful voice in the contemporary 
debate around international labour standards. This debate 
took off around the Uruguay Round of the GAIT and has 
continued in the ILO, WTO and the OECD as well as in the 
EU, N AFf A and, now, APEC (Ha worth and Hughes 1996a 
and b). 
The ICFTU supports an international Social Clause based on 
seven core ILO standards dealing with the abolition of 
forced labour (Conventions 29 and 105), freedom of asso-
ciation and collective bargaining (Conventions 87 and 89), 
prevention of discrimination in employment and equal pay 
for work of equal value (Conventions 100 and 111) and the 
minimum age for employment (Convention 138)(1CFfU 
1996).These are core standards because they are, or should 
be, universaL not simply in the purlieu of the industrialised 
economies. The implementation of this Social Clause would 
protect union organisation and collective bargaining, outlaw 
forced and slave labour, seek to end discrimination in the 
labour market and end the commercial exploitation of chil-
dren. Consequent! y, extreme forms of exploitation would be 
outlawed without depriving developing countries of their 
comparative advantage and, assert the ICFrU, international 
growth would be encouraged on the basis of 'a more bal-
anced expansion of world trade and a smoother process of 
adjustment to changes in the global division of labour'. The 
ICFTU also sees the Social Clause as a means of disciplining 
TNC behaviour which is unacceptable. 
Underpinning the ICFfU case is the belief that the WTO 
provides a ideal opportunity for the imposition of a Social 
Clause internationally. If trade liberalisation could be allied 
to a Social Clause, both patrolled by a WTO or WTO/ILO 
disciplinary process, nation-states and TNCs might be forced 
to adhere to core conventions as the price for trade advan-
tages. But the ICFrU approach is not all 'stick'. Following 
Sengenberger, they see positive advantage emerging for the 
TNC from the application of the Social Clause. Improved 
application of technology, better skilled workers and co-
operative labour relations would also follow from an inter-
national standards regime. 
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ICFTU -APRO and APEC 
The operation of the ICFI'U approach to the Social Clause 
is well observed in the context of APEC(ICFfU 1995). 
Founded in 1989, APEC today groups eighteen economies 
on the Pacific Rim in an informal relationship committed to 
trade liberalisation, trade facilitation and regional develop-
ment. Adopting a philosophy of 'open regionalism ', APEC 
chooses informal, non-binding means to bring together a 
sense of direction for its members. Its economic might is 
unquestionable given the inclusion of Japan and the US- it 
accounts for 46% of total world exports and 53% of world 
gross product. 
Why is APEC important to the ICFfU ? Obviously, the 
economic significance of the group is a significant factor. 
However, there are other reasons. First, there are members 
of APEC prepared to promote international labour stand-
ards, particularly the US. Second. there are important areas 
of trade union growth in APEC, particularly in the newly-
industrialised economies of East Asia. Third, there are 
examples to be found in APEC of the extreme exploitation 
identified by the ICFfU as demanding international protec-
tion. Fourth, the region is the destination for large-scale FD I 
and is experiencing growing intra-regional FDI. Fifth, the 
PRC' s liberalisation raises the question of working condi-
tions in the 2 1st century's dominant economy. Sixth, impor-
tant and powerful regional trade union organisations are able 
to organise around APEC ( particularly the Japanese union 
movement). Seventh, APEC may well grow when the cur-
rent moratorium on new membership expires. Vietnam, 
Russia, Pakistan, India, Peru and Colombia are some of the 
candidates pressing for future membership. 
APEC operates . at a number of levels - national leaders 
meetings, ministerial meetings, officials' meetings, and, 
importantly , a range of Working Groups, one of which is 
charged with Human Resource Development issues. This 
has been identified by APEC leaders as a critical area for 
regional development and numerous activities take place 
under the working group's auspices. The ICFrU argue that 
the working group has taken a narrow definition of its 
responsibilities, substantially ignoring social development 
issues and focusing primarily on flexibility matters. The 
ICFfU suggests that this narrow focus misses the advan-
tages offered to economic growth of a fully-integrated social 
development approach. 
In sum, the ICFI1J view of APEC is that it is a major 
international bloc which could achieve its goals more effec-
tively by taking on board the Social Clause and a broader 
interpretation of social development needs. A 1995 Mel-
bourne meeting of the ICFfU put together a trade union 
strategy for APEC based on this view. The stated aim of the 
strategy is to support APEC' s agenda for market internation-
alisation by establishing the benefits for all parties of im-
proved working and living conditions. To this end, the 
ICFI1J support the development of a comprehensive social 
dimension to APEC processes (rather than the current con-
strained vision), the creation of a work programme to ad-
dress the problem of unemployment, clearer and stronger 
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protocols on investment (in line with the OECD's Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment), and arrangements for regu-
lar consultation with trade unions. 
Interpreting the I CFTU Strategy 
Strategically, the ICFfU has recognised that the regional 
blocs which have grown up in parallel with the EU provide 
an opportunity for the extension of labour rights in an 
otherwise generally hostile environment. As we have shown 
above, the EU and NAFf A in different ways have provided 
structures which may be extended into the Asia-Pacific 
region. The activities of the ETUC and its responses to the 
EU agenda provide an organising model for labour in other 
regions, while the NAFf A side-agreement, despite its criti-
cisms, provides a model for countries concerned with issues 
of national sovereignty. A number of arguments support this 
strategy. First, there is the positive sum outcome argument 
- collaboration with trade unions will improve economic 
performance. This is not too far from an argument which 
poses positive sum relations between labour and capital as a 
necessary condition for sustainable capitalism. Second, there 
is a strong element of moral pressure in the strategy. Each 
incident of unacceptable behaviour by a TNC, each chal-
lenge to national sovereignty poses the question of appropri-
ate political controls on international capital. Equally, the 
question of adherence to reasonable labour standards 1s 
posed. 
There are a number of elements to this which we cover in 
depth elsewhere (see Haworth and Hughes, 1996a; 1996b; 
1997c). However in the context of the present discussion a 
number of points can be made. First, the identification of a 
set of core labour standards constituting basic human rights 
implies the potential for a universal acceptance of these 
rights in the context of economic development. Such an 
acceptance will transcend cultural particularities. Conse-
quently, domestic non-observance of these standards be-
comes an international issue. Second, the identification of 
these core standards poses the related question of enforce-
ment. One outcome of the Social Clause debate has been the 
re-examination of regional enforcement structures of the 
type discussed above, and the rationale for their existence. 
This examination has prompted a sustained critique of 
international regulation, the functions of bodies such as the 
WTO and has provided a fertile ground for future initiatives 
by international labour. 
Future research 
The authors are currently engaged in research in the follow-
ing (selected) areas, a) APEC and the implications for New 
Zealand. This is a collabrative, FORST funded, research 
project involving other academics at The University of 
Auckland. The project looks at the implications for New 
Zealand of APEC regional integration with specific refer-
ence to Human Resource Development, Migration and En-
vironmental issues; b) Trade and International Labour Stand-
ards. This established work centres around the debate over 
the observance by countries of certain core labour standards 
in the context of multilateral trade agreements. The question 
199 
of regional initiatives has been of particular interest in 
formulating the research to date. 
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